SUBJECT: Task Force 1-11 Combat After Action Report

26 February 1971


                    (Operation WOLFE MOUNTAIN) (U)


        d.  Phase IV:  TF1-11 assumes responsibility for MAI LOC area and conducts search and clear, reconnaissance in force, night ambush, fire support base security, pacification, and civil affairs operations in AO WHITE.


9.    (C)   INTELLIGENCE:  Enemy Situation:


        a.  Phase I: During Phase I fighting continued in AO GREEN with elements of the 304th NVA Division. The enemy continued to conduct mortar attacks and some ground attacks on elements of TF 1-11. Towards the end of the phase the 304th NVA Division withdrew its forces from AO GREEN. At this time elements believed to have been from the 27th Bn, LFG remained in the area and operated in squad size and smaller units.


         b.  Phase II:  During this phase the enemy units operating in the AO were avoiding contact with our friendly operations. The enemy efforts were concentrated on the collection of intelligence, rice collection and proselyting. The enemy made extensive use of booby traps inflicting maximum casualties on our forces while not having to expose himself. On numerous occasions NDPís and RONís that were used by our forces were extensively booby trapped by the next time the next unit occupied the position. Sensor activity was medium to heavy in the southwestern portion of the AO but when offensive operations were launched in response to the sensor activations there were seldom any sightings or contacts. It was believed that the mountainous area in the southwestern portion of the AO might be used as a staging area by the enemy unit that was going to conduct the incursion into the lowlands during the latter part of this phase. The incursion never did occur and the main reason could have been due to the heavy rains and flooding that occurred during the last week of October. Following the rains and floods the RF/PF units conducted extensive search and clear operations in the lowlands which netted them numerous caches of food stuffs and some arms and ammunition.


        c.  Phase III:  Battalion conducted Quarterly Training Cycle


        d.  Phase IV:  Based on intelligence indicators 1-11 Infantry moved to MAI LOC and conducted operations in the vicinity of MAI LOC and to the south of MAI LOC. Numerous sensor activations and sightings to the south of MAI LOC indicated the enemy might be preparing to launch offensive operations in the MAI LOC area. It was expected that the VC/VCI would concentrate on the hamlets and villages in order to collect information and to propagandize the populace. Shortly before Phase IV started reconnaissance elements from the 31st LFG were reported in the vicinity of MAI LOC and throughout the HUONG HOA District. The only elements that were encountered were elements of the 31st LFG. The TET offensive that was supposed to have been launched in the area was not launched mainly because of the offensive operations conducted by the battalion.




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